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PUBLIC OFFICIALS' QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY IN SECTION 1983
ACTIONS UNDER HARLOW v.
FITZGERALD AND ITS PROGENY: A
CRITICAL ANALYSIS
Stephen J. Shapiro*
Forty-two U.S.C. section 19831 (section 1983), enacted in 1871
as part of the Ku Klux Klan Act,2 provides individuals with a
federal cause of action for violations of their constitutional and
other federal statutorys rights by persons acting under color of
state law. In 1961, the Supreme Court in Monroe v. Pape" held
that a plaintiff could recover damages from a government official
who violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights by actions that
were not "authorized" by state law.5 The Court, however, insu-
lated from suit the municipal corporations that employed such
officials, holding that Congress did not intend to include munici-
pal corporations within the ambit of section 1983.6 This part of
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. B.A., Haverford
College, 1971; J.D., University of Pennsylvania College of Law, 1976.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the pur-
poses of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of
Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
2. Ku Klux Klan Act, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
3. See, e.g., Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
4. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
5. The Court reversed a line of cases that held that state action did not include be-
havior by a state official that was illegal under state law. See Note, Developments in the
Law: Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1133, 1156-61 (1977). The Court in
Monroe broadened the "under color of [state] law" requirement to include not only situ-
ations where the constitutional deprivation was authorized by state law, but also situa-
tions involving "[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible
only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law." 365 U.S. at 184
(quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)).
6. The Court interpreted the defeat of the Sherman Amendment, which would have
made cities and counties liable for certain acts of violence which occurred within their
borders, as a rejection of any and all municipal liability under § 1983. "The response of
the Congress to the proposal to make municipalities liable for certain actions being
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the opinion was reversed seventeen years later in Monell v. De-
partment of Social Services,7 where the Court held that local
governing bodies could be sued directly under section 1983.8
Municipal corporations would not be responsible on a respon-
deat superior basis for all constitutional violations committed
by their employees, but only those violations in which execution
of a government policy or custom caused the injury.9
The decision in Monell caused two types of section 1983 dam-
age suits to arise. The first type arises when government policy
or a government official following government policy directly
causes injury. In such a case, the injured party may sue the gov-
ernment directly.10 In the second scenario, a government em-
ployee who is not acting pursuant to official policy causes the
brought within federal purview by the Act of April 20, 1871, was so antagonistic that we
cannot believe that the word 'person' was used in this particular Act to include them."
Id. at 191.
7. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
8. The Court held that it had misinterpreted the rejection of the Sherman Amend-
ment. That amendment would have held counties responsible "for private lawlessness"
over which they might not have had control. Rejection of this principle, which was
viewed as unfair and possibly unconstitutional, did not imply a rejection of municipal
liability for constitutional violations committed by the municipality itself. "From the
foregoing discussion, it is readily apparent that nothing said in debate on the Sherman
Amendment would have prevented holding a municipality liable under § 1 of the Civil
Rights Act for its own violations of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 683.
9.
We conclude, therefore, that a local government may not be sued under
§ 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is
when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its
lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent offi-
cial policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible
under § 1983.
Id. at 694. The Court relied both on the "shall subject or cause to be subjected" language
of the statute and again on the rejection of the vicarious liability of the Sherman
Amendment to reach this conclusion. Id. at 691-94. For an explanation and criticism of
this reasoning, see Mead, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Municipal Liability: The Monell Sketch
Becomes A Distorted Picture, 65 N.C.L. REv. 517 (1987), and infra note 168.
Because the violation in Monell had clearly been caused by official government policy,
the Court's statement was actually dictum. Yet the Court has applied this standard con-
sistently since Monell. See, e.g., City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 108 S. Ct. 915, 922-27
(1988); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 477-85 (1986); City of Oklahoma
City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816-24 (1985).
10. Such suits are sometimes brought against the individual defendant in her "offi-
cial capacity." The suits are treated as if they were brought against the governmental
entity.
It is not a suit against the official personally, for the real party in interest is the
entity. Thus, while an award of damages against an official in his personal capac-
ity can be executed only against the official's personal assets, a plaintiff seeking
to recover on a damages judgment in an official-capacity suit must look to the
government entity itself.
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985); see also Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464
(1985).
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harm. In this situation, the injured party may bring suit against
the employee in his personal capacity." Proof of a constitutional
violation alone does not render a government official liable, how-
ever. Starting with Pierson v. Ray,' 2 the Supreme Court has cre-
ated a number of immunities, holding that Congress, in enacting
section 1983, did not intend to abolish all common-law immuni-
ties."s Judges14 and prosecutors' 5 or those acting in a judicial or
prosecutorial capacity, 6 are afforded absolute immunity from
damages. Most other government employees, including law en-
forcement personnel, are accorded qualified, or "good faith"
immunity. 17
The main reason that the Court gives for granting qualified
immunity to law enforcement personnel is that immunity allows
them to exercise their duties in good faith without fear of having
to pay damage awards. 18 Absolute immunity grants to a small
class of defendants the additional protection of freedom from
damages even when it is alleged that they have acted "mali-
ciously or corruptly."' 9 There is, however, a significant extra cost
to absolute immunity. In order to protect some "innocent" offi-
cials from the threat of litigation, clearly culpable conduct of
11. Graham, 473 U.S. at 165-67.
12. 386 U.S. 547 (1967). See infra notes 36-41 and accompanying text for further
discussion of this case.
13. See infra notes 114-20 and accompanying text for further explanation.
14. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967); see also Stump v. Sparkman, 435
U.S. 349 (1978).
15. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
16. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978). The Court in Butz developed a func-
tional approach to immunities, holding that a person's immunity depended not upon
one's title, but rather upon one's responsibilities: "Judges have absolute immunity not
because of their particular location within the Government but because of the special
nature of their responsibilities." Id. at 511.
17. E.g., Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978) (granting qualified immunity to
prison officials); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (granting qualified immu-
nity to mental hospital administrators); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (grant-
ing qualified immunity to school officials); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974)
(granting qualified immunity to officers of the executive branch of a state government);
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (granting qualified immunity to police officers).
18. In Scheuer v. Rhodes, the Court stated:
Implicit in the idea that officials have some immunity-absolute or quali-
fied-for their acts, is a recognition that they may err. The concept of immunity
assumes this and goes on to assume that it is better to risk some error and possi-
ble injury from such error than not to decide or act at all.
416 U.S. 232, 242 (1974); see also Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967) ("A police-
man's lot is not so unhappy that he must choose between being charged with dereliction
of duty if he does not arrest when he has probable cause, and being mulcted in damages
if he does.").
19. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 335, 351 (1871)).
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others must go unremedied.20 Recently, the Supreme Court has
significantly expanded the scope of qualified immunity, so that
it more resembles absolute immunity. Recognizing that any in-
quiry into the subjective good faith of an official usually involves
an issue of fact to be resolved at trial, the Court has adopted a
purely objective standard. The new standard, established in
Harlow v. Fitzgerald,2 protects officials from damage liability
"insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known. 22
Although this standard serves the Court's purposes of avoid-
ing trial and discovery in many cases, there are several problems
with this approach, especially with how it has been refined by
more recent cases. 2s To the extent that the standard protects an
official who acted maliciously or in bad faith, it grants more pro-
tection than is warranted, and more protection than was ac-
corded at common law. Since the Court has already determined
that Congress's intent was to preserve common law immuni-
ties, ' any attempt to extend them for the purpose of cutting
down on section 1983 litigation is a usurpation by the Court of
Congress's legislative authority.2 5 Moreover, the Court, in re-
sponding to what it considers an explosion of civil rights suits,
may be trying to deal with a problem that is either non-existent
or not nearly as significant as the Court believes.26 The new
standard also makes it much more difficult to use section 1983
for establishing new constitutional rights or defining the outer
edges of existing constitutional rights, because the standard per-
mits only preexisting rights to be remedied.' If the purpose of
qualified immunity is to protect officials acting reasonably and
in good faith, while holding liable those acting unreasonably or
in bad faith, then there may be no fair alternative to factfinding
preceded by discovery. This alternative might subject some offi-
cials to litigation who might not ultimately be liable for dam-
20. In Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978), the Court upheld the use of absolute
immunity by judges, "[d]espite the unfairness to litigants that sometimes results." Id. at
363.
21. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
22. Id. at 818. See infra notes 59-72 and accompanying text for a further discussion
of the Harlow case.
23. Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S. Ct 3034 (1987) (see infra text accompanying notes
80-86); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984) (see infra text accompanying notes 73-79).
24. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55 (1967); see infra notes 36-41 and accompa-
nying text.
25. See infra notes 113-26 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 127-32 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
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ages. Because the determination of whether there has been a
constitutional violation can usually be made on motion for sum-
mary judgment, however, only those who have committed consti-
tutional violations would be forced to litigate the issue of
whether they acted in good faith. Forcing officials who had com-
mitted constitutional violations to litigate whether they were en-
titled to immunity in spite of the violations does not seem un-
fair, especially when compared to the alternative of leaving
remediless a plaintiff whose constitutional rights have been vio-
lated in bad faith.
Another way to solve this problem would be for the Court or
Congress to reverse the decision in Monell holding government
employers harmless for the constitutional violations of their em-
ployees, except when caused by government policy. 8 This would
remove the burden of litigation from the employee and place it
on the government, where the Court in similar circumstances
has held that it more rightly belongs. 9
Part I of this Article discusses the development of immunities
in section 1983 actions. Part II examines the application of
Harlow and its progeny to a variety of situations. This discus-
sion shows that broadened qualified immunity produces anoma-
lous results under some circumstances by granting immunity to
officials who have acted in a clearly culpable manner. Part III
discusses the appropriateness of the Harlow standard and deter-
mines that it is neither supported by the legislative history of
section 1983 nor by legitimate policy concerns. Finally, Part IV
proposes several solutions that would protect deserving public
officials from personal damage liability without unnecessarily
depriving plaintiffs of their right to recover.
I. OFFICIAL IMMUNITIES UNDER SECTION 1983
As a consequence of the decision in Monell v. Department of
Social Services,"0 a potential plaintiff must look to the source of
the violation to determine the proper entity against which to
bring suit. Although section 1983 plaintiffs might want to sue
the governmental employer directly,31 they can do so only if the
28. See infra notes 165-77 and accompanying text.
29. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980). See infra notes 173-77 and
accompanying text.
30. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
31. There are a number of reasons why a plaintiff might want to sue the governmen-
tal employer rather than the individual defendant. First, as a practical matter, the gov-
WINTER 1989]
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constitutional violation was caused by a government policy or
custom.3 2 If a non-policymaking, lower-level employee violates
section 1983, then the only remedy is a suit against the responsi-
ble individual.3 3 Thus, in the typical police misconduct case, the
plaintiff must sue the individual officers involved, to redress an
illegal search and seizure or illegal arrest or excessive use of
force, unless a municipal policy directly led to the violation.3 4
These individual defendants are not liable for damages merely
upon a finding of a constitutional violation. The Supreme Court
has developed a system of immunities to shield officials from
damages in certain cases. The kind of immunity received is
based on the function the official was exercising at the time of
the violation. Those exercising judicial or prosecutorial functions
are given absolute immunity from damages. Those exercising ex-
ecutive functions, such as police officers, are given qualified, or
good faith immunity.3 5
ernment is more likely to have the assets to satisfy any judgment against it. See Jaron,
The Threat of Personal Liability Under the Federal Civil Rights Act: Does It Interfere
with the Performance of State and Local Government?, 13 URE. LAW. 1, 24 (1981). Sec-
ond, unlike an individual defendant, a municipal defendant will not be able to assert a
qualified immunity to damages. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980). See
Mead, Evolution of the "Species of Tort Liability" Created by 42 U.S.C. § 1983: Can
Constitutional Tort Be Saved From Extinction?, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 6 n.29 (1986).
32. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); see supra note 8
and accompanying text.
33. City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985) (finding city not liable for
excessive use of force by police officer). Actions taken by upper level officials with poli-
cymaking authority, however, will make the municipality liable, even if such actions were
taken on a one-time basis and were not intended to establish standards for future con-
duct. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986). In such a case, however, the
official must have "final policymaking authority," not subject to review by a superior.
City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 108 S. Ct. 915 (1988).
34. Plaintiffs have tried to establish that excessive use of force or other violations by
police officers have been caused by a policy of inadequate or improper training. The
Court, in City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985), reversed a judgment
against a municipality based on inadequate training. The Court held that a policy of
inadequate training could not be inferred from a single incident of misconduct. Id. at
823-24. The Court expressed no opinion "whether a policy that itself is not unconstitu-
tional, such as the general 'inadequate training' alleged here, can ever meet the 'policy'
requirement of Monell." Id. at 824 n.7. The Court answered that question in the affirma-
tive in City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 57 USLW 4263 (Feb. 28, 1989). It held that inade-
quacy of police training may serve as the basis for municipal liability under § 1983. In
order to prevail, however, plaintiffs must not only show that the city's training program
was inadequate. They must also show that "the need for more or different training is so
obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights,
that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indif-
ferent to the need." Id. at 4273. Additionally, plaintiffs must show that the "deficiency in
a city's training program is closely related to the ultimate injury." Id. at 4274. Therefore,
although the Court in City of Canton theoretically allowed "inadequate training" suits,
it established a very difficult evidenciary burden on plaintiffs.
35. See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
Qualified Immunity
The seminal case for both absolute and qualified immunity
from section 1983 damage actions is Pierson v. Ray.36 Pierson
was a section 1983 lawsuit against local police officers and judges
to redress plaintiffs' unconstitutional arrests and convictions
during a civil rights march. Looking at the legislative history of
section 1983, the Court held that "[t]he legislative record gives
no clear indication that Congress meant to abolish wholesale all
common law immunities.""7 Therefore, the Court looked to the
common law to determine what kind of immunities existed for
governmental officials at the time section 1983 was passed. The
Court held that at common law judges were absolutely immune
from damages for acts committed within their judicial
discretion."
This immunity applies even when the judge is accused of
acting maliciously and corruptly, and it is not for the
protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but
for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the
judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions
with independence and without fear of consequences.3 '
As to police officers, the Court held: "The common law has
never granted police officers an absolute and unqualified immu-
nity."' 0 Instead they were granted immunity if they acted in
good faith under a statute they believed to be valid, even if the
arrest later turned out to be unconstitutional.' The Court re-
manded the case to the trial court to determine whether "the
officers reasonably believed in good faith that the arrest was
constitutional.' 42
The Court further defined qualified immunity under section
1983 in Scheuer v. Rhodes.' Scheuer was an action brought
against the governor and other Ohio officials growing out of the
36. 386 U.S. 547 (1967). Actually, Pierson was preceded by Tenney v. Brandhove,
341 U.S. 367 (1951), a pre-Monell case holding members of state legislatures absolutely
immune from suit under § 1983 for actions taken in their legislative capacities.
37. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554.
38. "Few doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the immunity
of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction,
as this Court recognized when it adopted the doctrine, in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335
(1871)." Id. at 553-54.
39. Id. at 554 (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, note at 349-50
(1871) (quoting Scott v. Stansfield, 3 L.R.-Ex. 220, 223 (1868)).
40. Id. at 555.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 557.
43. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
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shootings at Kent State University. After first deciding that the
governor and other executive officers were entitled to qualified
immunity," the Court defined what appeared to be a subjective
test for the immunity, based on the good faith belief of the of-
ficer involved. 45 The Court recognized in Scheuer that applica-
tion of this standard would require an inquiry into the facts."'
One year later, in Wood v. Strickland,47 the Court, by a five to
four vote, increased the burden of those employing the qualified
immunity defense. In addition to proving "subjective" good
faith, which the Court defined as "acting sincerely and with a
belief that he is doing right,"" the official must also show "ob-
jective" good faith. This standard is "based not only on permis-
sible intentions, but also on knowledge of the basic, unques-
tioned constitutional rights of his charges."'4 9 Under the new
standard, the official would lose his qualified immunity from
damages "if he knew or reasonably should have known that the
action he took. . . would violate the constitutional rights of the
student affected, or if he took the action with the malicious in-
tention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other
injury to the student." 0
Four justices, in dissent, argued against including the objec-
tive standard as part of the test. They feared that it would be
too difficult to determine what are "unquestioned constitutional
rights." 1 They argued for use of only the subjective standard as
laid out in Scheuer: "whether in light of the discretion and re-
44. The Court of Appeals had held that the officials were entitled to absolute immu-
nity. Id. at 242. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that they were entitled only to
qualified immunity. These considerations suggest that, in varying scope, a qualified im-
munity is available to officers of the executive branch of government; the variation de-
pends upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circum-
stances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action. Id. at 247.
45. Id. at 247-48. "It is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at
the time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with good faith belief, that affords
a basis for qualified immunity of executive officers for acts performed in the course of
official conduct." Id.
46. Id. at 242-43. "If the immunity is qualified, not absolute, the scope of that immu-
nity will necessarily be related to facts as yet not established either by affidavits, admis-
sions, or a trial record." Id.
47. 420 U.S. 308 (1975). Wood was a suit brought by public high school students
against members of the school board, who had allegedly expelled them from school with-
out affording them a proper hearing. Id. at 309-10.
48. Id. at 321.
49. Id. at 322.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 329 (Powell, J., dissenting). "One need only look to the decisions of this
Court-to our reversals, our recognition of evolving concepts, and our five-to-four
splits-to recognize the hazard of even informed prophecy as to what are 'unquestioned
constitutional rights.'" Id.
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sponsibilities of his office, and under all of the circumstances as
they appeared at the time, the officer acted reasonably and in
good faith.""2
In Wood v. Strickland all nine justices favored using the sub-
jective test for sovereign immunity. 3 The only disagreement be-
tween the majority and the dissent was whether to include an
objective test in addition to the subjective test.54 Given this, it is
quite astonishing that in Harlow v. Fitzgerald" the Court com-
pletely abandoned the subjective test in favor of a purely objec-
tive one.
Harlow was a suit for damages for constitutional violations
brought against several senior aides and advisors to the Presi-
dent of the United States. Because section 1983 does not apply
to federal officials," Harlow was not actually a section 1983 case.
The Supreme Court has held, however, that a private right of
action for damages arises from certain constitutional provi-
sions. 7 Therefore, damage actions may be brought against fed-
eral officials for constitutional violations even though section
1983 does not apply.58 Such suits are known as "Bivens actions,"
named for the case that first established them. Harlow was such
a Bivens action. The Court first determined that the aides would
receive qualified immunity if they could not establish that their
52. Id. at 330 (Powell, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 321-22 and 327-28 (Powell, J., dissenting).
54. Id.
55. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
56. Most federal officials are not proper defendants in a § 1983 action because they
are not acting "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982); see District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S.
218 (1973). Congress amended § 1983 in 1979 to include defendants acting under color of
the local laws of the District of Columbia, Pub. L. No. 96-170, 93 Stat. 1284 (1979), but
most federal government employees are still not covered by § 1983.
57. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971) (involving a fourth amendment violation); see also, Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14
(1980) (involving an eighth amendment violation); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979)
(involving a fifth amendment equal protection violation).
58. See Eisenberg & Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 COR-
NELL L. REv. 641 (1987), distinguishing between "civil rights litigation" generally and
"constitutional tort litigation":
Civil rights litigation encompasses litigation under many federal statutes, includ-
ing nineteenth- and twentieth-century antidiscrimination provisions. Constitu-
tional tort litigation refers to a subset of civil rights litigation. The term encom-
passes both action brought against state and local authorities under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and similar actions brought against federal officials based on Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics.
Id. at 643 (footnotes omitted); see also Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REv.
5 (1980); Comment, Respondeat Superior Liability of Municipalities for Constitutional
Torts After Monell: New Remedies to Pursue?, 44 Mo. L. Rav. 514 (1979).
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functions required absolute immunity."' The Court recognized
that the subjective part of the qualified immunity test often in-
volved issues of fact that needed to be resolved by the factfinder
and thus precluded summary judgment.60 The Court noted that
an inquiry into the facts was inconsistent with an earlier admo-
nition that "insubstantial lawsuits be quickly terminated,"" l and
that "insubstantial claims should not proceed to trial.""2
The Court recognized that most officials were given qualified,
rather than absolute, immunity because a damage action might
be the "only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional
guarantees." 3 If absolute immunity were applied in such cases,
the plaintiff might lose her only avenue of redress. Because
"claims run against the innocent as well as the guilty,"" how-
ever, the Court recognized that such litigation involved costs not
only to the defendants, "but to society as a whole."6 5 The Court
recognized four societal costs: the expenses of litigation; the di-
version of energy from pressing public issues; the deterrence of
able citizens from accepting public employment; and fear that
the threat of lawsuits would "dampen the ardor of public offi-
cials in discharging their duties."66
The Court also mentioned the special costs involved in litiga-
tion concerning the subjective state of mind of officials perform-
ing discretionary functions. Allowing discovery to determine an
official's state of mind could be "peculiarly disruptive of effec-
tive government,"67 because "judicial inquiry into subjective mo-
tivation. . . may entail broad-ranging discovery and the depos-
ing of numerous persons, including an official's professional
colleagues."68 The Court, therefore, held that "bare allegations
of malice should not suffice to subject government officials either
to the costs of trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching discov-
ery."6 9 The new standard for qualified immunity would involve
59. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813 (1982). In the companion case Nixon v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 751 (1982), the Court held that the President of the United
States would receive absolute immunity from civil damages for his actions as President.
60. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816.
61. Id. at 814 (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507-08 (1978)).
62. Id. at 816.
63. Id. at 814.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied,
339 U.S. 949 (1950)).
67. Id. at 817.
68. Id. The Court recognized that discovery of this kind against a President's closest
aides "could implicate separation-of-powers concerns." Id. at 817 n.28.
69. Id. at 817-18.
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only the objective component. Officials would be shielded from
liability "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly estab-
lished statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known."7 This standard, the Court opined,
could usually be decided by motion for summary judgment, be-
cause the judge, as a matter of law, could decide not only the
currently applicable law, "but whether that law was clearly es-
tablished at the time an action occurred. 7 1 Moreover, the Court
determined that the threshold immunity question could and
should be resolved before allowing any discovery. 2
The Supreme Court has decided several cases since Harlow
that have refined the standard established in that case. In Davis
v. Scherer,73 a state employee sued under section 1983 because
he had been terminated from his position without being afforded
procedural due process. The District Court held that the proce-
dures used to fire the plaintiff were inadequate under the Four-
teenth Amendment, 7  but held that the due process rights
claimed by the plaintiff had not been clearly established in that
circuit when he was fired.75 The court looked to the "totality of
the circumstances '70 and held that the defendants had forfeited
their qualified immunity because they violated the agency's "ex-
plicit regulations, which have the force of state law," and there-
fore that their conduct was inherently unreasonable.77
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Harlow stan-
dard was the only permissible way to overcome qualified immu-
nity, and that no other standards were relevant to the issue of
qualified immunity.78 Whether the official's conduct violated
state law was not relevant. "Officials sued for constitutional vio-
lations do not lose their qualified immunity merely because their
conduct violates some statutory or administrative provision. ' ' Te
70. Id. at 818 (citing Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 565 (1978); Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975)). Even if the Court found that the right in question
had been clearly established, the official might still avoid liability if he or she "claims
extraordinary circumstances and can prove that he neither knew nor should have known
of the relevant legal standard." Id. at 819.
71. Id. at 818.
72. Id.
73. 468 U.S. 183 (1984).
74. Id. at 187 (citing Scherer v. Davis, 543 F. Supp. 4, 14 (N.D. Fla. 1981)).
75. Id. at 188.
76. Id. (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974)).
77. Id. (quoting Scherer v. Davis, 543 F. Supp. 4, 20 (N.D. Fla. 1981)).
78. Id. at 191.
79. Id. at 194.
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In Anderson v. Creighton,"0 the Court refined the Harlow
standard and gave instructions regarding how it should be ap-
plied in a fact-specific situation. A Bivens action was brought
against an FBI agent who had conducted a warrantless search
for a fugitive he believed was hiding in plaintiff's home. The
District Court granted summary judgment for defendant on the
ground that the search was lawful, holding that the undisputed
facts revealed that the defendant had probable cause to search
the plaintiff's home and that his failure to obtain a warrant was
justified by exigent circumstances.81 The Court of Appeals re-
versed, holding that unresolved factual disputes made it impos-
sible to determine as a matter of law whether probable cause
and exigent circumstances had been present.82 The court further
held that the defendant was not entitled to summary judgment
on qualified immunity grounds because the right he was alleged
to have violated-the right to be free from warrantless searches
of one's home without probable cause and exigent circum-
stances-had been clearly established.83 The Supreme Court re-
versed. Although the Court agreed that the right in question had
been clearly established, it held that the clearly-established-law
test could not be applied at this level of generality and must be
applied in a more particularized sense.8 Although the right to
be free from warrantless searches and seizure without probable
cause and exigent circumstances had been clearly established,
the Court of Appeals should have considered the argument that
it had not been clearly established that the particular circum-
stances with which the defendant was confronted did not consti-
tute probable cause and exigent circumstances.85 The Court held
that the relevant question was "the objective, (albeit fact-spe-
cific) question whether a reasonable officer could have believed
Anderson's warrantless search to be lawful, in light of clearly es-
tablished law and the information the searching officers
possessed."8 6
80. 107 S. Ct. 3034 (1987).
81. Id. at 3037-38.
82. Id. at 3038 (citing Creighton v. St. Paul, 766 F.2d 1269, 1272-76 (8th Cir. 1985)).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 3038-39.
85. Id. at 3039.
86. Id. at 3040.
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II. APPLICATION OF Harlow, Davis, AND Anderson
By removing the subjective good faith element from the quali-
fied immunity test, the Supreme Court clearly made it more dif-
ficult for plaintiffs to overcome defendants' claims of qualified
immunity. 7 The Court stated that the reason for this change
was to protect public officials from the expense of defending
lawsuits, some of which might turn out to be insubstantial.8 8
The Court failed to consider that by so doing, a deserving plain-
tiff whose constitutional rights had been violated might be left
without a remedy. When, in 1967, the Court created absolute
immunity for judges, they recognized this possibility."s They did
not seem to recognize, however, that they were creating the same
sort of problem by removing the requirement of subjective good
faith from the qualified immunity standard.
A recent Supreme Court case demonstrates the problem. In
Tennessee v. Garner,90 plaintiff's son, an unarmed burglary sus-
pect, had been shot and killed while fleeing a Memphis police
officer. Both Tennessee law and Memphis police policy author-
ized the use of deadly force to stop a fleeing felon.91 The District
Court had denied liability against both the city and the officer
on the ground that it was not unconstitutional to use deadly
force against a fleeing felon.2 The Supreme Court held that use
of deadly force to prevent the escape of a fleeing felon violates
the fourth amendment unless "the officer has probable cause to
believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm,
either to the officer or to others."'
The Supreme Court decided only the substantive constitu-
tional issue and not the issue of liability for damages.94 It is
clear, however, that under Harlow the officer would be entitled
to immunity because he was relying in good faith on a state stat-
ute and department regulation which had not yet been held un-
constitutional. Given the facts, this result seems reasonable and
fair. The plaintiff most likely would be able to recover from the
87. See S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION 462 (2d ed. 1986);
Comment, Harlow v. Fitzgerald: The Lower Courts Implement the New Standard for
Qualified Immunity Under Section 1983, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 901, 905 (1984).
88. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
89. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967).
90. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
91. Id. at 4-5 (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-7-108 (1982)).
92. Id. at 5-6.
93. Id. at 11.
94. The Court remanded for a determination of whether the police department and
the City of Memphis would be liable under the Monell standard. Id. at 22.
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City of Memphis because the department regulation, which
would be considered city policy, was unconstitutional and
caused the violation of decedent's rights."
Let us now assume, however, that neither the state nor the
department had any explicit policy dealing with the use of
deadly force on a fleeing suspect. If the police officer, mistakenly
believing that it was proper to shoot a fleeing burglary suspect,
shot and killed the decedent, he would be immune from dam-
ages. At the time he took his action, such acts had not been
ruled unconstitutional. He would be protected under either the
Harlow standard or the earlier subjective good faith standard.
Nor could the plaintiff recover from the city, because city policy
did not prompt the action which led to the violation."6 The
plaintiff in this scenario would be left remediless. Unfortunately,
this cost must be borne by some members of society if public
officers are to be encouraged to perform their jobs to the best of
their abilities without worrying that later second-guessing by the
courts will result in their personal liability for actions which at
the time were not unconstitutional.9 7
If we assume this time that the police department did have a
regulation specifically prohibiting use of deadly force except
when the suspect poses a danger to the officers or others, then
we would have a Davis v. Schereres situation. In Davis, the
Court held that the violation of a state statutory or administra-
tive provision was simply not relevant to the issue of whether
the defendant would receive qualified immunity. The result
would be the same even where, as in this case, the statute or
regulation "advanced important interests or was designed to
protect constitutional rights." 99 This position does not strike a
proper balance between protecting plaintiffs' constitutional
rights and protecting officials' ability to perform their duties
without fear of liability for actions they had no reason to believe
were improper. In such a case officials have been found to have
violated plaintiffs' constitutional rights. They have also been
found to have violated state and local regulations designed to
protect those rights. Officials are not being held liable because
95. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
96. City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 824 (1985).
97. Plaintiffs in such a situation could be provided with a remedy without imposing
personal liability on the official involved if the Court were willing to reverse its holding
in Monell that municipal defendants will not be liable on a respondeat superior basis.
See infra notes 166-72 and accompanying text.
98. 468 U.S. 183 (1984).
99. Id. at 195.
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they violated state regulations. Existence of those regulations,
however, should deprive them of the claim that they had no rea-
son to believe that their actions were improper. Where a defend-
ants' actions are clearly improper under state law and violate
plaintiff's constitutional rights, then liability should attach.
The Court in Davis gave only two reasons for not taking this
position, which it admitted was "not without some force."'1 00 The
Court indicated that officials in such situations would not be
able to "anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability
for damages." 10' This is true, because even if officials knew they
were violating state regulations, they would only be held liable if
the state regulation violation turned out to be a constitutional
violation, which would not have been settled at the time of the
actions. This seems to be the wrong standard. Officials should be
held liable for their constitutional violations not only if they had
reason to know that they might be liable, but also if they had
reason to know that their conduct was unlawful or improper.
The Court also stated that its goal that "unjustified lawsuits are
quickly terminated" might be jeopardized if qualified immunity
depended on the meaning or purpose of a state administrative
regulation, because federal judges might not be able to deter-
mine such questions on motions for summary judgment.102 How-
ever, the Court gave no reasons why federal judges, who daily
make such determinations of state law, could not do so in this
case.
o03
The Court seemed concerned that officials are subject to a
plethora of rules with which they cannot always comply. 04 If
they are required to determine whether their actions comply
with all applicable rules, interference with the swift and firm ex-
100. Id. at 194.
101. Id. at 195.
102. Id.
103. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982), Congress has directed the federal courts to
adopt and use state law in civil rights cases if there is no existing federal rule on point.
See, e.g., Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985) (holding that federal court must choose
most appropriate state statute of limitations for § 1983 actions).
Recently, in City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 108 S. Ct. 915 (1988), the Court, in a
§ 1983 case, held that federal courts are perfectly capable of interpreting state law to
determine if a state official has policymaking authority: "We are not, of course, predict-
ing that state law will always speak with perfect clarity. We have no reason to suppose,
however, that federal courts will face greater difficulties here than those that they rou-
tinely address in other contexts." Id. at 925.
104. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 196 (1984) (quoting P. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERN-
MENT 66 (1983) ("These officials are subject to a plethora of rules, 'often so voluminous,
ambiguous, and contradictory, and in such flux that officials can only comply with or
enforce them selectively.' ")).
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ercise of their duties may result. 105 But one must only take our
hypothetical one step further to see that even if a state regula-
tion were specifically called to the attention of the official, he
would still be immune under Davis. Even if we assume that at
morning roll call on the day of the shooting the officers were
informed of the department policy about use of deadly force and
specifically admonished to follow it, the officer would still not be
liable. The Court in Davis held that "no other 'circumstances'
except whether the defendant's conduct had violated clearly es-
tablished constitutional law were relevant to the issue of quali-
fied immunity.106 Thus, plaintiff would not be given the oppor-
tunity to show that defendant had specific knowledge that his
conduct was unlawful.
One can see how absurd the rule is when the standard is ap-
plied to the extreme case. Suppose that just as an officer is
about to shoot the fleeing suspect, his partner shouts for him to
stop, that regulations prohibit the shooting. Even if the officer
turns and says, "I don't care, I feel like shooting someone to-
day," he would still not be liable under the Harlow standard. It
is clear that any "qualified" immunity that would protect a de-
fendant in such a case is for all practical purposes an absolute
immunity.
Application of the Harlow standard, especially as refined in
Anderson v. Creighton,10 7 not only restricts damage recoveries
by individual plaintiffs, but inhibits the development of consti-
tutional civil rights law generally. Constitutional tort cases have
been one of the most constructive vehicles for defining and ex-
panding citizens' civil rights. Before Harlow, a court could reach
and decide the constitutional issue before considering the immu-
nity issue. Under Harlow, the trial judge may dismiss the case
on a summary judgment motion on the immunity issue without
reaching the constitutional issue.
Assume, for example, that a plaintiff's complaint alleged the
violation of a constitutional right in a factual situation which
had not yet been ruled upon by the courts. The court could find
that a newly recognized constitutional right of the plaintiff had
been violated. The defendant might be held immune from dam-
ages if she could show, either at trial or before, that she acted in
subjective good faith, and, therefore, the plaintiff might not re-
cover damages. But the result of the lawsuit would still be to
105. Id.
106. Id. at 191.
107. 107 S. Ct. 3034 (1987).
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establish that right for the future, so that the next time it was
violated, damages would be awarded. The official would lose her
immunity because after the first case she should have known of
the existence of the constitutional right.
Under Anderson, this could no longer happen. Before the
court would rule on whether the facts amounted to a constitu-
tional violation, the judge would first have to determine whether
the specific constitutional right had been previously "clearly es-
tablished." If it had not, the case would be dismissed and the
court would never rule on whether the right should be estab-
lished or applied to those circumstances. 10 8 Constitutional civil
rights would not be completely static because other avenues
might be open for litigation of new or expanded rights, 09 but
one of the best vehicles for doing so has been curtailed.
Anderson creates additional, sometimes insurmountable,
problems for plaintiffs. Without explicitly doing so, the Court
seems to have changed the burden of pleading on the qualified
immunity issue. In Gomez v. Toledo,"10 the Court had held that
the burden of pleading a qualified immunity defense rests with
the defendant. Although Anderson does not purport to change
that holding, it is clear from the holding that a plaintiff is re-
quired to plead facts that show that the constitutional right had
been established in those particular circumstances. The Court
stated: "Thus, on remand, it should first be determined whether
the actions the Creightons allege Anderson to have taken are ac-
tions that a reasonable officer could have believed lawful."' 11'
This may be particularly difficult for plaintiffs to do without
the benefit of discovery, when the standard established by the
court takes into account the information possessed by the de-
fendant. The actual standard established by the Court was
"whether a reasonable officer could have believed Anderson's
warrantless search to be lawful, in light of clearly established
law and the information the searching officers possessed."'1 2
Without the benefit of discovery, how can a section 1983 plain-
108. Id. at 3042 n.6. One commentator has referred to this situation as a "Catch-22."
McCann, The Interrelationship of Immunity and the Prima Facie Case in Section 1983
and Bivens Actions, 21 GONz. L. REv. 117, 139-40 (1985-86).
109. New rights could be established in a number of ways, including § 1983 injunc-
tive actions; actions against municipalities, which cannot claim immunity, Owen v. City
of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980); actions against private parties who have conspired
with government officials, Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970); and as de-
fenses to criminal actions; see McCann, supra note 108.
110. 446 U.S. 635 (1980).
111. 107 S. Ct. 3034, 3042 n.6.
112. Id. at 3040 (emphasis added).
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tiff hope to show that a defendant official possessed such infor-
mation that made his actions unreasonable?
III. THE Harlow STANDARD IS NOT SUPPORTED BY LEGITIMATE
PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS.
A. The Application of Harlow to Section 1983 Cases Usurps
Congressional Prerogative.
In holding certain officials immune from section 1983 damage
claims, the Supreme Court did not rely on statutory language,
nor, in the first instance, on policy considerations. The statute
requires that "every person" who violates the constitutional
rights of another "shall be liable." 13 Rather, the Court inter-
preted congressional intent to determine that Congress, in pass-
ing section 1983, did not intend to abolish those immunities that
officials enjoyed to common law damage actions: "The legislative
record gives no clear indication that Congress meant to abolish
wholesale all common-law immunities."11 4
The process that the Court employed until Harlow in deter-
mining whether and what kind of immunity an official would re-
ceive involved looking to the immunity granted such an official
at common law. Because legislators acting in their legislative
role received absolute immunity for their actions, it was as-
sumed that Congress would have expected them to enjoy this
immunity to section 1983 suits.1 Similarly, the Court held that
judges were absolutely immune from damages for acts commit-
ted within their judicial discretion.1 '
The situation with police officers was different, however. "The
common law has never granted police officers an absolute and
unqualified immunity . .. 1.7 Police officers were generally en-
titled only to "good faith" immunity from damages in suits for
false arrest and other common law actions."'
113. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982); see supra note 1 for the text of the statute.
114. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967).
115. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
116. "The immunity of judges for acts within the judicial role is equally well estab-
lished, and we presume that Congress would have specifically so provided had it wished
to abolish the doctrine." Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55 (1967); see supra notes 43-
5 and accompanying text.
117. Id. at 555.
118. The Court held that a police officer would be immune "for acting under a stat-
ute that he reasonably believed to be valid but that was later held unconstitutional, on
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This is not to say that the Court ignored the policy reason
behind granting such immunities. The Court has consistently
recognized that immunity from damages plays an important role
in allowing government officials to perform their jobs in a "prin-
cipled and fearless" manner, without fear of personal conse-
quences.1 9 Yet it is clear that the Court did not purport to be
exercising its own independent policy judgments in establishing
the immunities, but rather was interpreting congressional intent
in passage of the act. The Court indicated that Congress could
have abolished the immunities, which are not constitutionally
based, had it so desired. 20 Although they do not explicitly so
state, the clear implication is that the Court would have
respected such congressional intent, even had they disagreed
with the policy implications.
The Court appeared to abandon the congressional intent in-
quiry when in Harlow the Court significantly expanded the qual-
ified immunity of executive officials. Harlow rests solely on pol-
icy considerations.12 This in itself was not illegitimate, because
Harlow was a Bivens action against federal officials rather than
a section 1983 suit against state officials. Because Bivens was a
judicially rather than a congressionally created remedy, the
Court was free to establish limits based on policy on the remedy
that it had created. In fact, although the Court noted that the
same immunities usually applied under section 1983 and Bivens
actions, it explicitly noted that it was not deciding any immu-
nity issues in section 1983 actions. 22 The real problem arose
when the Court applied the Harlow standard, practically with-
out comment, to a section 1983 suit in Davis v. Scherer.123 In-
its face or as applied." Id. The Court noted that Mississippi law granted such a "limited
privilege" to police officers. Id.
119. Id. at 554.
120. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
121. The Court hoped to avoid the costs and governmental disruption which it
thought accompanied the factual determination required by the good-faith standard.
The Court determined that replacing it with an objective legal standard would allow
immunity claims to be decided by motion for summary judgment before discovery.
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
122. The Court stated:
This case involves no issue concerning the elements of the immunity available
to state officials sued for constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We
have found previously, however, that it would be "untenable to draw a distinc-
tion for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against state officials
under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal
officials."
Id. at 818 n.30 (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978)).
123. 468 U.S. 183 (1984). Although the Davis Court recognized that Harlow was a
Bivens action and Davis was a § 1983 action, the opinion merely restated the proposi-
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deed, the Court later recognized in Anderson that in Harlow it
had "completely reformulated qualified immunity along princi-
ples not at all embodied in the common law, replacing the in-
quiry into subjective malice so frequently required at common
law with an objective inquiry into the legal reasonableness of the
official action."12 By altering the standard, the Court disre-
garded its own statement that congressional intent should be ex-
amined to determine the breadth of the immunities at common
law. The Court, as a result, should not have applied an immu-
nity different from and broader than those known at common
law. The language of section 1983 grants no immunities.
The Court defended its departure from the common law by
stating that it had "never suggested that the precise contours of
official immunity can and should be slavishly derived from the
often arcane rules of the common law."' 25 Harlow, however was
not a minor adjustment'26 to some "arcane rule" relating to im-
munity. It was, as the Court admitted in Anderson, a complete
departure from the whole concept of common law good faith im-
munity. Any change that completely removes the issue of an offi-
cial's good faith from good faith immunity is in fact an entirely
new kind of immunity, one that grants significantly more protec-
tion to defendants.
Not only was the Court in Harlow engaging in legislative ac-
tivity reserved for Congress, but it may have been doing so
based on false assumptions. Certain members of the Court have
voiced their concern that a flood of constitutional tort cases,
many of them meritless, have besieged the federal courts.1 1 7 The
chief evidence cited to support this proposition has been the An-
nual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the
U.S. Courts, which lists the number of civil rights cases filed
each year. For example, Justice Powell noted, in Patsy v. Board
of Regents,'28 decided the same year as Harlow, that the number
tion that "our cases have recognized that the same qualified immunity rules apply in
suits against state officers under § 1983 and in suits against federal officers under Bivens
v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents." Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194 n.12.
124. Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S. Ct. at 3041-42 (1987).
125. Id. at 3041.
126. The Court in Harlow did refer to the change as "an adjustment" of the good
faith standard. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982).
127. See Eisenberg and Schwab, supra note 58, at 646; Blackmun, Section 1983 and
Federal Protection of Individual Rights-Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade
Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 1-3 (1985).
128. 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
[VOL. 22:2
Qualified Immunity
of civil rights filings had increased from 270 in 1961, the year
Monroe v. Pape was decided, to more than 30,000 in 1981. '29
Recent empirical research has shown, however, that these sta-
tistics are grossly misleading, and that constitutional tort cases
do not represent such a large number or a large percentage of
the federal caseload. Professors Eisenberg and Schwab per-
formed a more careful analysis of this data, showing that consti-
tutional tort cases filed by non-incarcerated persons actually in-
creased at a much more moderate rate. This rate was in fact
much lower than the rate of increase for all federal litigation
generally. ' The problem with the Court's use of the Adminis-
trative office data is that these figures lumped all civil rights
cases together. This group includes a very large number of pris-
oner habeas corpus cases, private employment discrimination
claims brought under Title VII, and claims under other civil
rights statutes, all of which are unrelated to section 1983 or con-
stitutional tort cases.131 In fact, by combining their study of the
national data with a very detailed study of every civil rights case
filed in the Central District of California for 1980-81, Eisenberg
and Schwab estimated that constitutional tort cases make up
approximately four percent of the caseload of the federal courts,
not the twenty percent that Justice Powell's figure represents.3"
B. The Harlow Standard is Not Appropriate for Non- Poli-
cymaking Officers.
The concern in Harlow that high-level policy-making would be
disrupted is not present in the typical section 1983 case. The
defendants in Harlow were close aides to the president, upper-
level policy-making officials of the federal government. The
Court was appropriately concerned that a judicial inquiry into
the subjective motivation of such high-level officials would dis-
rupt government operations.1 3 3 Because of the different rules for
129. Id. at 533 (Powell, J., dissenting).
130. Eisenberg and Schwab, supra note 58, at 662-68.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 693.
133. The Court was concerned that an inquiry into subjective motivation might "en-
tail broad ranging discovery and the deposing of numerous persons, including an official's
professional colleagues." Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817. The Court speculated that this might
hamper the policymaking process:
A president and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the
process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many
would be unwilling to express except privately. These are the considerations jus-
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section 1983 and Bivens actions, this problem would not exist if
the alleged unconstitutional actions had been taken by upper-
level policy-making officials of a municipal, rather than the fed-
eral government.
In Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati"" the Supreme Court held
that all actions taken by officials of local governments making
final policy decisions would be considered government policy.1 35
In such instances the local governing body would be liable for
damages under Monell. The issue of qualified immunity would
not arise in such a case because local governments cannot assert
the qualified immunity of their officials.1 36 The typical section
1983 case in which qualified immunity would be raised is much
more likely to involve a lower-level official such as a police of-
ficer. While there may be governmental costs associated with de-
termining the subjective good faith of such officials, they are cer-
tainly much less than with that of the president's closest aides
or upper-level municipal policy-making officials.
Such differences should, at least, have led the Court to
reevaluate the Harlow standard before applying it to section
1983 actions in Davis and law enforcement officers in Anderson.
As discussed earlier, however, the Court summarily dismissed
the issue without serious deliberation.1 37 This action was con-
trary to earlier Court opinions which indicated that a different
standard might be appropriate for police officers than for upper-
level executive officials.1 3 8 Thus, in its desire to have a single
tifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. The privilege is
fundamental to the operation of Government and inextricably rooted in the sep-
aration of powers under the Constitution.
Id. at 817 n.28.
134. 475 U.S. 469 (1986).
135. "We hold that municipal liability under § 1983 attaches where ... a deliberate
choice to follow a course of action is made from among various alternatives by the official
or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in
question." Id. at 483-84.
136. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
137. Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S. Ct. 3034 (1987).
138.
When a court evaluates police conduct relating to an arrest its guideline is
"good faith and probable cause." In the case of higher officers of the executive
branch, however, the inquiry is far more complex since the range of decisions
and choices - whether the formulation of policy, of legislation, of budgets, or of
day-to-day decisions-is virtually infinite. . . . In short, since the options which
a chief executive and his principal subordinates must consider are far broader
and far more subtle than those made by officials with less responsibility, the
range of discretion must be comparably broad . ...
These considerations suggest that, in varying scope, a qualified immunity is
available to officers of the executive branch of government, the variation being
dependent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all
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standard for all defendants, the Court may be applying a stan-
dard that is inappropriate for the majority of section 1983 cases
which are brought against individual officers.
C. The Harlow Standard is Not Necessary or Appropriate
to Eliminate Insubstantial Claims.
The Supreme Court's stated purpose in imposing the Harlow
standard was to allow "the dismissal of insubstantial lawsuits
without trial. 13' 9 Again, in Davis v. Scherer, the Court men-
tioned terminating "frivolous suits without protracted litiga-
tion." ' ° It is clear that the Harlow standard, especially as ap-
plied in Davis and Anderson, will result in the dismissal of more
section 1983 lawsuits without trial, or even discovery. Admit-
tedly, a certain percentage of all lawsuits, including civil rights
suits, are insubstantial or frivolous; so the standard will, in a
certain sense, accomplish its goal of early termination of some
civil rights suits. As shown above, however, Harlow will also re-
sult in the dismissal of some deserving claims."" Unless the
standard can distinguish between substantial and insubstantial
claims, its imposition is not worth its price.
What the Court meant by "insubstantial" or "frivolous" suits
must first be determined. If the Court meant that the plaintiff
had pleaded a claim that was not or should not be considered a
constitutional violation, then the Harlow standard is clearly un-
necessary in these situations. Even before Harlow, the court in a
section 1983 case would not even reach the immunity question
until it first determined, as a matter of law, whether the plaintiff
had pleaded a violation of a constitutional right. If the plaintiff
had not alleged a violation of a constitutional right, then the
case would be dismissed and no immunity would be necessary to
protect the defendant.
The Supreme Court has been troubled by what it perceives as
a flood of section 1983 litigation,'42 particulary cases that it felt
involved the constitutionalization of claims which were in reality
the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on
which liability is sought to be based.
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 245-47 (1974) (citation omitted).
139. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982).
140. 468 U.S. 183, 196 (1984).
141. See supra notes 96-106 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 127-129 and accompanying text.
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state tort claims. 143 Especially troubling have been due process
claims brought to redress deprivation of property caused by the
negligent actions of state officers 144 and suits brought by state
prisoners to redress violations committed against them. 14 The
Court has already dealt with this perceived problem in a more
appropriate manner by limiting the scope of substantive rights
deemed deserving of constitutional protection. For example, in
Paul v. Davis, the Court held that a person's reputation is not
an interest protected by the fourteenth amendment.16 In Par-
ratt v. Taylor, the Court held that an adequate state remedy
precluded a finding of most due process violations.147 Daniels v.
Williams precluded due process violations founded only upon
negligence. 48 Hudson v. Palmer restricted the fourth amend-
ment rights of prisoners.1 4 9 Certainly the substantive restrictions
in these cases should be adequate to eliminate trivial or insub-
stantial lawsuits from the federal courts.
The Court also could have meant, by frivolous or insubstantial
lawsuits, cases where plaintiff had pleaded a constitutional viola-
tion, but in fact, the violation had not taken place. The Court
seemed to be referring to these situations in Harlow when it re-
marked "that claims frequently run against the innocent as well
as the guilty. 1' 50 Yet the Harlow standard will not eliminate
these kinds of factually insubstantial claims, because the Court
143. In Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), a suit brought to redress damage to plain-
tiff's reputation when he was mistakenly identified as a shoplifter by police, the Court
stated: "Respondent's construction would seem almost necessarily to result in every le-
gally cognizable injury which may have been inflicted by a state official acting under
'color of law' establishing a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 699. In Par-
ratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), a suit by a state prisoner to redress the negligent loss
of a hobby kit valued at $23.50, the Court stated:
Presumably, under this rationale any party who is involved in nothing more
than an automobile accident with a state official could allege a constitutional
violation under § 1983. Such reasoning "would make of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment a font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may already
be administered by the States."
Id. at 544 (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)).
144. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
145. See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (involving prisoner injured
when he slipped on a pillow negligently left on staircase by prison guard); Davidson v.
'Cannon 474 U.S. 344 (1986)(involving prisoner injured by failure of guards to protect
him from another inmate); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984)(involving a prisoner
complaint of unreasonable shakedown search of cell).
146. 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976); see supra note 143.
147. 451 U.S. 527, 543 (1981); see supra note 143.
148. 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
149. 468 U.S. 517, 525-26 (1984) (holding that the fourth amendment does not apply
within the confines of a prison cell).
150. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982).
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may look only to the plaintiff's pleading. As long as a plaintiff
pleads a violation of an established constitutional right, Harlow
will not bar the suit. Any plaintiff willing to fabricate a constitu-
tional violation would be willing to fabricate a clearly estab-
lished one to avoid Harlow. It is unclear exactly how much of a
problem is posed by fabricated section 1983 claims, but sum-
mary judgment motions based on failure by plaintiff to provide
substantial evidence of a violation would seem much more suited
to eliminating such claims.
There is another possible meaning for the insubstantial or
frivolous lawsuits referred to by the courts. Under the pre-
Harlow standard, there were cases in which a plaintiff had
truthfully and accurately alleged a constitutional violation, but
the defendant had claimed a good faith immunity. The Supreme
Court in Harlow correctly noted that the issue of good faith, in-
volving factual issues, could often not be decided until trial.6
There would have been cases, therefore, where the jury found
that a constitutional violation had been committed, but also
found the defendant immune from damages because he had ac-
ted in good faith. Many of these cases will no longer go to trial,
as the defendant's actual good faith is no longer at issue. Never-
theless, to describe these cases as insubstantial or frivolous
seems a misnomer.
To be sure, cases have gone to trial in which the defendant
has eventually been found not liable. It is hard to see how such
cases can be called insubstantial, however, because there is nec-
essarily a finding that the defendant has, in fact, violated the
plaintiff's constitutional rights. Certainly it is not a case of a
claim against an "innocent" defendant proceeding to trial, about
which the court was most concerned in Harlow. By providing a
qualified immunity for public officials found to have violated the
constitutional rights of another, the Court has not determined
that such officials are innocent, or that such claims are insub-
stantial. It has merely concluded that the societal costs of pun-
ishing such defendants are too high.
If these claims are viewed not as frivolous, but as claims where
a constitutional violation has occurred but the defendant is
spared liability, then the equation changes. Clearly, the Harlow
standard has the cost of throwing out claims for which the de-
fendant should be held liable. This cost might be acceptable if it
were necessary to weed out frivolous claims. But the Harlow
standard is best not at weeding out frivolous claims in the sense
151. Id. at 816.
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that no constitutional violation has occurred, but at terminating
claims where the plaintiff has been injured by defendant's con-
stitutional violation, albeit committed in good faith.
The Harlow defense has the unwanted side effect of protect-
ing some undeserving defendants from liability. Its major posi-
tive effect, however, is not in protecting any additional deserving
defendants from ultimate liability. Rather, it spares some de-
fendants who had committed constitutional violations, but in
good faith, from the expenses and hardships of trial, at the cost
of protecting other defendants, who acted with malice. If indeed
the Court is concerned about protecting defendants who had ac-
ted in good faith from the costs of trial, there are other ways of
accomplishing this same result without depriving plaintiffs of a
remedy against those who acted with malice.
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO THE Harlow STANDARD
The purpose of this Article has been to show that the modi-
fied qualified immunity standard applied to presidential aides in
Harlow v. Fitzgerald3 2 should not have been extended to sec-
tion 1983 cases in Davis v. Scherer, 53 nor to police officers in a
fact-specific manner in Anderson v. Creighton."" There are
three possible courses of action which could eliminate the un-
fairness of these cases, while to varying degrees addressing the
concerns expressed by the Supreme Court in Harlow. Given the
Court's recent opinions, however, it is unlikely that the Court
would be willing to take any of these steps. Therefore, congres-
sional action may be necessary.
The first solution would be to reserve the Harlow standard for
Bivens actions, while returning to a subjective good faith test for
section 1983 actions against lower-level executive officials. Al-
though the Supreme Court may have accomplished its goal in
Harlow of allowing courts to decide claims of qualified immunity
without significant litigation costs, this was done only at the ex-
pense of depriving some deserving civil rights plaintiffs of their
only viable remedy. Because the Court was without authority to
make this "exception" to a clear Congressional statute, it would
be appropriate for Congress to reinstate the subjective good
152. 457 U.S. 800 (1982); see supra notes 55-72 and accompanying text.
153. 468 U.S. 183 (1984); see supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
154. 107 S. Ct. 3034 (1987); see supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
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faith standard of Scheuer v. Rhodes,1 55 at least in section 1983
cases involving non-policymaking government officials.
The second solution would be to return to a subjective test for
section 1983 cases, but to shift the burden of proof on the issue
of immunity to plaintiffs. In developing the Harlow standard,
the Court was most concerned that in constitutional tort cases
"insubstantial claims should not proceed to trial." 56 The normal
mechanism in the federal courts for achieving this is the motion
for summary judgment."' The Harlow Court was concerned,
however, that "an official's subjective good faith" was an issue of
fact that "some courts have regarded as inherently requiring res-
olution by a jury."' 18 Yet Rule 56 requires a denial of a motion
for summary judgment only when there is a "disputed" issue of
material fact.
The most typical situations involving the grant of a motion for
summary judgment occur when the nonmoving party has the
burden of proof on an issue. 59 In those cases, unless the non-
moving parties can come up with some evidence on the issue,
summary judgment will be granted. They cannot, in that case,
rely on the allegations in their complaint. Moreover, it is consid-
erably more difficult for the party with the burden of proof on
an issue to be granted summary judgment. In that case the non-
moving party can avoid the motion not only by providing his
own evidence on the issue, but by challenging the sufficiency or
credibility of the movant's evidence.'10
Although the Supreme Court has never ruled on who has the
burden of proof on a qualified immunity claim, it has held that
155. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
156. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816.
157. FED. R. Civ. P. 56. The Rule provides that summary judgment "shall be ren-
dered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
158. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816 (citing Landrum v. Moats, 576 F.2d 1320, 1329 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 912 (1978); and Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 832-33
(2d Cir. 1977)).
159. J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 441 (1985).
160. Id.; see also Louis, Federal Summary Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis,
83 YALE L.J. 745, 747 (1974). Louis argues:
If the movant bears the burden of proof-either because he is the plaintiff or
because he is asserting an affirmative defense-then he must establish all essen-
tial elements of the claim or defense. If the movant does not bear the burden of
proof, then he can obtain summary judgment simply by showing the nonexis-
tence of any essential element of the opposing party's claim or affirmative
defense.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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the burden of pleading is on the defendant. 61 Most circuits have
held that the defendant also has the burden of proof on a quali-
fied immunity claim. 162 A much less drastic step that the Court
could have taken, which might have accomplished much of what
it sought in Harlow, would have been to put the burden of prov-
ing lack of good faith squarely on the plaintiff. Plaintiffs could
not merely rely on allegations of bad faith but would have to
come up with some real evidence of defendant's malice. As any
plaintiff in a public figure libel case will tell you, that is no easy
task.1 63 Therefore, if Congress chose to reinstate the subjective
good faith standard, but was concerned that plaintiff could bring
a case to trial based on unsupported allegations of malice, Con-
gress could make clear that the burden of showing bad faith was
on the plaintiff.1 64
The last, best, and most far-reaching solution that would undo
the unfairness of Harlow would be a reversal of the Supreme
Court's holding in Monell that municipalities are not liable on a
respondeat superior basis for the constitutional torts of their
employees. It is this holding that forces plaintiffs to sue individ-
ual defendants personally and creates the need for qualified im-
munity in the first place. Under MoneUl, plaintiffs can recover
from the government only "when execution of a government's
policy or custom .. .inflicts the injury."' 66
161. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980).
162. Davidson v. Scully, 694 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1982); Reese v. Nelson, 598 F.2d 822
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 970 (1979); Landrum v. Moats, 576 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir.
1978); Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167 (D.C. Cir. 1977) cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978);
Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 538 F.2d 53 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976);
Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 930 (1975).
But see Hander v. San Jacinto Junior College, 519 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1975). See further
discussion of this issue in Gilden, The Standard of Culpability in Section 1983 and
Bivens Actions: The Prima Facie Case, Qualified Immunity and the Constitution, 11
HOFSTRA L. REv. 557, 594-98 (1983); S. NAHMOD, supra note 87 at 509-12.
163. Under the standard of New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), public
figure plaintiffs in libel cases must plead and prove defendant's actual malice. Even
though plaintiffs are granted discovery on this point, Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153
(1979), they often have trouble obtaining enough evidence to survive a motion for sum-
mary judgment. See Franklin, Good Names and Bad Law: A Critique of Libel Law and
a Proposal, 18 U.S.F. L. REv. 1, 10-11 (1983): "The Times decision, if administered with
rigorous summary judgment procedures, ensures that only the most egregious cases will
reach the jury."
164. This would accomplish the Supreme Court's goal in Harlow of avoiding trials in
unwarranted cases, but would not avoid discovery. In the libel area, however, the Court
was not willing to take away plaintiff's right to discovery, even though the Court realized
that there were some costs to first amendment rights by allowing discovery. Herbert v.
Lando, 441 U.S. 153 176-77 (1979). As noted above, it is grossly unfair to make qualified
immunity fact-dependent and then deny plaintiff discovery to establish the necessary
facts. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
165. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
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The Monell Court based its holding both on the statutory lan-
guage 6 ' and legislative history 67 of section 1983. However, both
of these bases for the opinion have been severely criticized else-
where. 18  In Monell, unlike in the cases establishing and ex-
panding personal immunities, the Court did not look at the pol-
icy implications of its decision. Had the Court done so, it would
have followed the universal common-law rule of holding employ-
ers liable for the torts of their employees. 18 This would have
advanced the Court's often-stated goals for section 1983: com-
166. The Court held that the "shall subject, or cause to be subjected," language of
§ 1983 "cannot be easily read to impose liability vicariously on governing bodies solely
on the basis of the existence of an employer-employee relationship with a tortfeasor." Id.
at 691-92. "[T]he fact that Congress did specifically provide that A's tort became B's
liability if B 'caused' A to subject another to a tort suggests that Congress did not intend
§ 1983 liability to attach where such causation was absent." Id. at 692 (citation omitted).
167. The Court noted that Congress had rejected the Sherman Amendment, which
was "the only form of vicarious liability presented to it." Id. at 693 n.57. "Equally impor-
tant, creation of a federal law of respondeat superior would have raised all the constitu-
tional problems associated with the obligation to keep the peace, an obligation Congress
chose not to impose . . . ." Id. at 693.
168. See Mead, supra note 9. As to the statutory language argument, Professor Mead
argues:
A construction of the causation language that rejects respondeat superior is
erroneous for several reasons. First, the language "subject or cause to be sub-
jected" suggests that Congress envisioned at least two scenarios. One situation
would be a section 1983 "person" acting to subject another to a constitutional
harm. In such a case the defendant actively causes the harm. The language
"cause to be subjected," however, suggests a very different situation. The use of
passive voice indicates that Congress also intended to impose liability for consti-
tutional harm on those who have not themselves done the "subjecting," but
rather are responsible for those who have. In such cases the defendant need not
have actively caused the harm to fall within the causation language. Thus, Con-
gress took into account that responsibility for constitutional harm exists in the
absence of actual participation in the events giving rise to the constitutional
deprivation.
Id. at 532-33. Professor Mead criticizes the statutory history argument as follows:
To infer from Congress' rejection of the vicarious liability in the Sherman
Amendment an intent to reject respondeat superior in section 1983 overlooks
the very distinction between the Sherman Amendment and section 1983 that the
Court had specifically recognized in the first part of its opinion. The vicarious
liability proposed in the Sherman Amendment would have made municipalities
liable for actions of private citizens over which the municipality had no control
.... Thus, it is unlikely that Congress' rejection of a broad form of vicarious
liability was also a rejection of respondeat superior, which is a narrow type of
vicarious liability for tortious acts of employees.
Id. at 535-36 (footnotes omitted).
169. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS
§ 69 at 499-500 (5th ed. 1984).
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pensation to injured victims, prevention of future violations, and
the vindication of constitutional rights. 170
Holding municipalities liable for the violations of their em-
ployees would also have avoided the problems associated with
personal liability that the Court was so concerned with and that
led the Court to expand individual immunity in Harlow. The
government, rather than the individual official, would be respon-
sible for the costs of litigation and any judgment. Individuals
would not be deterred by the threat of lawsuits from accepting
public employment, nor would public officials be afraid to act
because of the fear of personal liability. The Court in Anderson
recognized that some state governments had voluntarily insti-
tuted programs to "reimburse officials for expenses and liability
incurred in suits challenging actions they have taken in their of-
ficial capacities.' 7'  The Court found, however, that such pro-
grams were not "sufficiently certain and generally available" to
justify a reconsideration of Harlow. 1 2
The Court has held, in Owen v. City of Independence, 3 that
when, under MoneUl, a city may be sued directly for the viola-
tions of its policymaking officials, the city may not claim the
qualified immunity that the officials could have exerted person-
ally.17 4 The Court held that the two main reasons for granting
good faith immunities to the individual defendants175 were not
applicable to suits against the government itself.7 6 The Court
170. See Mead, supra note 9 at 539: "Compensation and deterrence considerations
would be advanced consistently if respondeat superior were the basis of section 1983
municipal liability."
171. Anderson, 107 S. Ct. at 3040 n.3.
172. Id.
173. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
174. Id. at 638.
175. The two main reasons asserted were:
(1) the injustice, particularly in the absence of bad faith, of subjecting to liability
an officer who is required, by the legal obligations of his position, to exercise
discretion; (2) the danger that the threat of such liability would deter his willing-
ness to execute his office with the decisiveness and the judgment required by the
public good.
Id. at 654 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974)).
176. Id. at 654-56.
The first consideration is simply not implicated when the damages award
comes not from the official's pocket, but from the public treasury. It hardly
seems unjust to require a municipal defendant which has violated a citizen's
constitutional rights to compensate him for the injury suffered thereby ....
The second rationale mentioned in Scheuer also loses its force when it is the
municipality, in contrast to the official, whose liability is at issue. At the heart of
this justification for a qualified immunity for the individual official is the con-
cern that the threat of personal monetary liability will introduce an unwar-
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held, moreover, that both the compensatory and deterrent func-
tions of section 1983 would be served by denying governments
good faith immunity. 17
Reversing Monell would render cities liable for all constitu-
tional violations of their employees, and it would slightly in-
crease the total liability for such violations. The increased liabil-
ity would arise, however, in those cases where deserving
plaintiffs are now being denied liability. Under present law,
plaintiffs will be denied compensation for their injuries caused
by constitutional violations of government employees when they
cannot show either that the right was "clearly established" or
that the violation was caused by government policy. Plaintiffs'
recovery should not be denied in such cases, absent some good
reason. Although there may be good reason to deny personal lia-
bility in such cases, Owen makes clear that there is no good pol-
icy reason to deny governmental liability. Moreover, holding the
government responsible for such violations would have the
added benefit of eliminating litigation concerning qualified im-
munity and whether the violation was caused by city policy. The
Supreme Court may have been correct in trying to eliminate un-
necessary litigation from section 1983 cases. The Court adopted
a solution, however, that deprives deserving plaintiffs of a rem-
edy without considering solutions that would have served the
same purpose while compensating these victims.
V. CONCLUSION
In 1982 the Supreme Court significantly expanded the scope
of qualified immunity of executive officials from constitutional
tort claims. Harlow v. Fitzgerald removed the requirement that
an official act in subjective good faith in order to claim the im-
munity, in favor of an objective test. After Harlow, officials are
shielded from damages unless they violate a citizen's clearly-set-
tled constitutional rights.
The purpose of the new standard, which was developed in a
Bivens-type suit against the President's aides, was intended to
protect officials from the expenses and intrusion of discovery
ranted and unconscionable consideration into the decisionmaking process, thus
paralyzing the governing official's decisiveness and distorting his judgment on
matters of public policy. The inhibiting effect is significantly reduced, if not
eliminated, however, when the threat of personal liability is removed.
Id. (emphasis in original)(footnotes omitted).
177. Id. at 650-53.
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and trial necessary to a determination of subjective good faith.
It should not have been extended to section 1983 cases against
non-policymaking municipal officials. It overextends the protec-
tion to officials who are not deserving of the immunity, in viola-
tion of congressional intent in passing section 1983.
There is a better solution, which would protect deserving offi-
cials from litigation expenses and fear of liability for damages
without depriving deserving plaintiffs of recovery. The Court or
Congress should overturn the holding of Monell v. Department
of Social Services and impose liability on municipalities for the
consitutional violations of their officials, whether caused by mu-
nicipal policy or not. This would eliminate litigation regarding
the officials' state of mind and whether the violation was caused
by official policy, without greatly increasing the total amount of
damages awarded. And unlike the current standard, the pro-
posed ovefruling would provide a remedy to all plaintiffs who
have been harmed by the constitutional violations of govern-
ment officials, as Congress intended when it enacted section
1983.
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